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Abstract
We study users' response to sponsored-search advertising using data from Microsoft's Live
AdCenter distributed in the \Beyond Search" initiative. We estimate a structural model of utility
maximizing users, which quanties \user experience" based on their \revealed preferences," and
predicts user responses to counterfactual ad placements. In the model, each user chooses clicks
sequentially to maximize his expected utility under incomplete information about the relevance
of ads. We estimate the substitutability of ads in users' utility function, the xed eects of
dierent ads and positions, user uncertainty about ads' relevance, and user heterogeneity. We nd
substantial substitutability of ads, which generates large negative externalities: 40% more clicks
would occur in a hypothetical world in which each ad faces no competition. As for counterfactual
ad placements, our simulations indicate that CTR-optimal matching increases CTR by 10.1%
while user-optimal matching increases user welfare by 13.3%. Moreover, targeting ad placement
to specic users could raise user welfare by 59%. Here, we nd a signicant suboptimality (up
to 16% of total welfare) in case the search engine tries to implement a sophisticated matching
policy using a misspecied model that does not account for externalities. Finally, user welfare
could be raised by 14% if they had full information about the relevance of ads to them.
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11 Introduction
Over the past decade the Internet has become the dominant channel for consumer information
about goods and services. A substantial fraction of this information is provided through Internet
advertising. In 2007, Internet advertising revenues rose 26 percent to reach $21.2 billion, according
to the Internet Advertising Revenue Report published by the Interactive Advertising Bureau and
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP1.
To gain understanding of the online advertising market, compare alternative market structures
and designs, and examine their welfare eects, it is important to understand the behavior of con-
sumers in this market. Our paper makes a step in this direction, focusing on \search advertising,"
i.e., \sponsored links" that accompany results produced in response to the consumers' search queries.
Search advertising accounts for 41% of the total Internet advertising revenues. It is viewed as the
most eective kind of advertising because of its very precise targeting: a consumer's search string
reveals a great deal about the products (s)he is likely to be interested in. This precise targeting
allows to display only the most relevant ads, which in turn induces consumers to click on the ads.
While the market for search advertising has recently received a lot of attention, not much is known
about consumer behavior in the market. This paper makes a step towards remedying this problem.
Existing papers on search advertising postulate very simple and restrictive models of user be-
havior. For example, Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) propose a model that assumes that
the CTR (clickthrough rate) on a given ad in a given position is a product of ad and position specic
eects and does not depend on which other ads are displayed in the other positions. (Henceforth we
will refer to this model as the \EOS model," which is also used in Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007),
Varian (2006), Yenmez (2009), Gomes and Sweeney (2009), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009)). In the
\cascade model" (Craswell, Zoeter, Taylor, and Ramsey (2008), Papadimitriou and Zhang (2008)),
users consider the ads sequentially from top to bottom, deciding whether to click on the current
ad and whether to continue clicking with ad-specic probabilities. These restrictive models have
not been compared with actual user behavior. Also, as these models have not been derived from
utility-maximizing behavior of users, they could not be used to evaluate user welfare.
This paper oers the rst empirical investigation of user response to sponsored-search advertis-
ing that is based on a structural model of utility-maximizing user behavior. One advantage of a
structural model over reduced-form models is that once the model's parameters are estimated and
1http://www.scribd.com/doc/4787183/Internet-advertising-revenue-report-for-2007
2its t with the data is established, the model can be used to predict user behavior for all conceiv-
able counterfactual ad impressions. Another advantage of the model is that it quanties the \user
experience" on a sponsored-search impression as users' expected utility from the impression, and
estimates this utility from the preferences of actual users revealed by their clicking behavior, rather
than from the judgments of disinterested experts (as in Carterette and Bennett (2008)).2 Improving
user experience is crucial for the survival and growth of an Internet platform, and our model can
be used as a guide toward that goal.
Our dataset oers a selection of advertising impressions and user clicking behavior on Microsoft's
Live Search advertising engine. The data contains a random selection of search sessions between
August 10 and November 1, 2007. In each session, the user entered a search string and was then
shown \organic" search results accompanied by advertisements (\sponsored links"). An advertising
\impression" is an ordered list of sponsored links. (The rst sponsored link is displayed at the top
of the page in a highlighted box, while the others are displayed in a column to the right of the
organic search results.) For each advertising impression, our data describes the ads clicked by the
user and the times at which the clicks occurred.
Our estimation strategy is based on the fact that searches on the same search strings often
generate dierent advertising impressions. We treat this variation in impressions as exogenous and
uncorrelated with users' characteristics. Indeed, we have been assured that the impressions were
not conditioned on the user's known characteristics or browsing history. We also make the crucial
assumption that the characteristics of ads that determine users' values for them did not vary over
our 3-month window. This assumption appears plausible for the four search strings we consider:
\games," \weather," \white pages," and \sex".3 In fact, it is easy to convince oneself of the large
2Dupret and Piwowarski (2008) quantify ad quality by calibrating a heuristic model of user behavior on real data.
However, since their model is not based on utility maximization, it cannot be used to quantify user welfare.
3To understand the importance of this assumption, imagine that the preferences of users searching for \Paris
Hilton" changed abruptly from looking for a hotel in the capital of France to looking for the infamous sex video, and
that the advertising engine quickly responded to this preference change by changing the placement of ads. In this
situation, our estimation strategy would be invalid: for example, it might wrongly nd that putting an ad in the top
position raises its CTR when in fact it may just be that the engine puts the most relevant ad at the top and there is
no position eect for any given ad.
Microsoft plans to release a dataset in which ad impressions are truly randomized and independent of ad charac-
teristics { an initiative known as the \adCenter challenge:"
http://research.microsoft.com/workshops/ira2008/ira2008 talk.pdf
Repeating our analysis on this dataset would eliminate any possible concerns about the endogeneity of impressions.
3random component in ad placement by searching for the same search string several times in a row.
The ad placement results from several fast-changing factors, such as advertisers' varying bids and
budgets, the advertising engine's estimate of the ad's relevance based on its historical clickthrough
rate (CTR), and explicit experimentation by the engine. We believe that at least on our search
strings, this randomness swamps any possible shifts in the ads' relevance.
We begin by examining reduced-form evidence that contradicts the existing theoretical models
and suggests some dimensions in which the models need to be enriched. In particular, the EOS
model is contradicted by the prevalence of externalities across ads: the CTR on a given ad in a given
position depends on which ads are shown in other positions. For example, the CTR of Domain 1
in position 2 on the \white pages" search string is 18% if its competitor in position 1 is Domain
3 (which is not a good match for \white pages"because oers yellow pages ), but drops to 8%
if the competitor is Domain 2 (which is a specialized advertising company).4 This dierence is
statistically signicant. The \cascade model" is contradicted by the observation that 46% of the
users who click on ads do not click sequentially on positions (1,2,...), and 57% of the users who click
more than once do not \cascade," i.e., click on a higher position after clicking on a lower position.
Also, the data exhibits certain kinds of externalities that could not emerge in the cascade model:
the CTR on a given ad in a given position depends on which ads are shown below it, and the CTR
on a given ad in position 3 given the two ads shown in position 1 and 2 still depends on the order
in which the two ads.
Next, we formulate and estimate a structural model of rational user behavior that nests the
existing models. In our model, a user chooses his clicks sequentially under uncertainty about the
relevance of ads to him. The model is related to the literature on consumer search (e.g., Hong
and Shum (2006), Hortacsu and Syverson (2004)), the closest work being Kim, Albuquerque, and
Bronnenberg (2009), which estimates online search for durable goods at Amazon.com. The latter
paper assumes full satiation: a consumer gets utility from at most one purchase. Our model instead
parametrizes the degree of substitutability (satiation) among ads with a parameter R in a \Constant
Elasticity of Substitution" utility function. For R = 0, user utility is the sum of the utilities derived
from the clicked ads, and so there are no externalities across ads, as in the EOS model. At the
other extreme, when R = 1, user utility is the maximum of the values of the ads he clicks on, and
so he derives utility from at most one ad, and the externalities are the most prominent (similar to
4The domain names are available in the dataset by Microsoft does not allow us to publish them to protect advertiser
privacy.
4Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2009)).
In addition to the substitutability parameter R, our model includes a number of other param-
eters. For each of the more common ads, we estimate two xed eects: the probability of being
relevant and the user's utility derived if it does turn out to be relevant. Thus, we separately estimate
users' expectation of a given ad's value and their uncertainty this value. Also, we include xed cost
eects for clicking dierent positions, to capture the fact that the same ad receives more clicks when
shown in a higher position. We also allow for user heterogeneity by incorporating a user-specic
random utility eect whose variance we estimate. This eect proves important to t the data, in
which some users click on many ads and others on few or none.
We nd that externalities are both statistically and economically signicant. Our estimate of
the substitutability parameter R is 0.55. Using the estimate, we predict that the CTR on most
domains in the hypothetical world without externalities would have been substantially higher than
their actual CTR. We predict that the total number of clicks in our dataset would have been 40%
higher had satiation been absent. We nd evidence of user uncertainty: if this uncertainty were
resolved prior to clicking, consumer welfare would be 14% higher (and there would be no signicant
eect on the total CTR).5
We use our estimated model to predict user behavior on counterfactual ad impressions and
generates impressions that maximize the total CTR or the expected user welfare. It is well known
that in the EOS model, the total CTR is maximized by assortative matching of higher-quality ads
to better positions. The same is true in our model without externalities (R = 0), furthermore, in
this model the same assortative matching also maximizes expected user welfare (where \quality" is
interpreted as expected quality, and user uncertainty about quality does not matter). We simulate
outcomes6 of welfare-optimal and CTR-optimal matching policies and compare them to the data
and assortative matching according to simple OLS-type estimates. While in theory assortative
5Note that in our model of expected utility maximization, cardinal utility has empirical meaning: impression A
being x% better than impression B means that the user is indierent between receiving impression B for sure and
receiving impression A with probability
x
100+x and no ads at all with the complementary probability.
6These counterfactuals can be reliably interpreted as \short-run" counterfactuals. If an alternative placement
policy is implemented in the long run, one may ask if this will change any of the model's parameters. We think that
the only parameters that may be subject to change are the position xed eects, which capture the fact that users
are much more likely to click on the same ad in a higher position. If these xed eects stem from (psychic) clicking
costs, then they should not depend on the matching policy. If instead these eects are due to users' expectations that
higher positions contain more relevant ads, these expectations will be altered in the long run under the new matching
policy.
5matching does not have to coincide with optimal matchings, it turns out that in practice those
policies provide vary similar improvements (about 13% welfare gain and 10% CTR gain). It is
due to the fact that if the advertiser cannot target target ads on consumer level there is not much

exibility in matching strategies.
It has also been suggested that user experience and CTR could be improved by targeting the
impressions to individual users, e.g., based on their browsing history or demographics (E.g., see
Radlinski and Dumais (2006) for a discussion of targeting and ad diversity.) We can bound above
the gain in user welfare and CTR that could be achieved by such targeting, by simulating \rst-
best" targeting based on the users' individual characteristics. We nd that user-optimal rst-best
targeting could raise user welfare by 59%, while CTR-optimal rst-best targeting would raise the
total CTR by 49.7%. In this case placement policies do not coincide with user-by-user assortative
matching, and there are large dierences in welfare and CTR (up to 60% in welfare and 15% in
CTR). Moreover, we nd that if search engine was trying to use a misspecied model (that does
not account for externalities) to maximize consumer welfare or total CTR it might end up with
suboptimal solution that is Pareto dominated by simple assortative matching.
Athey and Ellison (2007) (henceforth AE) model user learning about general ad relevance in
the course of a search session: upon learning the relevance of a clicked ad, the user updates his
beliefs about the relevance of the other ads in the same impression.7 Our paper ignores this kind of
updating. There are two reasons for this: (1) Such updating would generate positive \informational
externalities" across ads { i.e., an ad would benet from having better ads in the same impression.
Empirically we nd that the overall externalities are instead negative, and it would be dicult to
separately identify both satiation externalities and informational externalities from the available
data. (2) We believe such updating to be a long-run rather than a short-run phenomenon. As
consumers use a given search engine frequently, we don't expect much learning about relevance to
occur in the course of a single session (as assumed in Athey and Ellison (2007)). While long-run
learning over the course of many sessions may prove to be very important, we are unable to observe
it in our data which does not keep track of user histories (for privacy reasons).
7In their basic model, the ads' texts are uninformative, and so the CTR on a given ad depends on the information
learned from clicking on the preceding ads, but not on the ad itself. User behavior in this model is similar to that in
the \cascade" model, with the added feature that the probability of continuing after clicking a given ad depends not
just on this ad's quality but also on the qualities of the ads above it (which determine user beliefs about the quality
of subsequent ads). Just as the cascade model, the AE model is inconsistent with non-sequential and non-cascading
clicks and with externalities from below.
6The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the dataset and examine some
reduced-form evidence. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 describes identication and es-
timation. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 simulates counterfactual matching
policies. Section 7 concludes.
2 The data and its preliminary analysis
2.1 Data Description
Our dataset oers a selection of advertising impressions and user behavior on Microsoft's Live Search
advertising engine. As of May 2008, Live Search had 9.1% of the U.S. online search market (as
compared to the market leader Google's 61.6%).8 This modest market share nevertheless translated
into about 900 million search queries per month. This enormous data is generally not available to
external researchers, primarily for fears of compromising user privacy. However, in 2008, Microsoft
created a DVD with a sample of user search and advertising data, cleaned up to eliminate privacy-
compromising information. This DVD was distributed to a few dozen recipients of Microsoft's
external research grants, as well as to a small number of other researchers, including the authors of
this paper.
The data on the DVD contains a random selection of search sessions between August 10, 2007 and
November 1, 2007. In each session, the user entered a search string and was then shown \organic"
search results accompanied by advertisements (\sponsored links"). An advertising \impression" is
an ordered list of sponsored links. The rst sponsored link is displayed at the top of the page in a
highlighted box, while the others are displayed in a column to the right of the organic search results.
For each sponsored link the user was shown a text display containing the advertiser's domain name
as well as brief advertising copy. For example, one ad produced in response to a search for \weather"
reads
Local Weather Forecast
Get Live Weather Forecasts & More With The Free Weather Toolbar
Weather.alot.com
For each advertising impression, our data describes the ads clicked by the user and the times at
which the clicks occurred.9
8http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/05/22/the-empire-strikes-back-our-analysis-of-microsoft-live-search-cashback/
9Advertising domains often experiment by varying the text of the advertising; we ignore this issue by ignoring the
7The sample of impressions on the AdCenter DVD was randomly generated from the search
engine's complete log le. The sampling scheme involved selecting an impression at random from
the log and then including all the other impressions displayed to the same user during the same
session. We were informed that the average length of a session is about 10 minutes. Impressions
that were part of longer user sessions have a proportionally higher probability to be in the data set
than shorter ones. Since the vast majority of the sessions contain only one impression, we believe
that sample selection issues are not of great importance.
Each data point was screened for privacy protection by Microsoft's technical team. On top of
the privacy screening, each search string was \normalized." We do not have full information about
the transformations employed, since this information is proprietary to Microsoft. However, we have
been assured that normalization did not involve anything more complicated than converting the
case of letters and getting rid of special characters, articles, and prepositions. We tried to minimize
the impact of such transformations by the choice of search strings to analyze.
The subset of the dataset that we examine contains the impressions produced on 4 search strings
(exact match): \games", \weather", \white pages" and \sex". These are the search strings that
produced the most sponsored-ad clicks in the data, with the exception of searches for domain names
and the \yellow pages" string. We did not consider searches for domain names like \google" or
\myspace" because we believe that such searches commonly arise when a user either (i) mistakenly
types a domain name into the search box, or (ii) types an incomplete domain name in the browser's
address bar, forgetting an extension such as \.com," and is redirected by the browser to the search
engine. The user's behavior in such situations may not be typical of his behavior following intentional
searches. We also excluded the searches for \yellow pages" since we did not nd enough variation
in the impressions on this query to estimate our model.
We matched the impressions on the selected search strings to clicks on these impressions, ap-
plying a couple of sanity rules. We dropped impressions with the same unique impression id since
we believe that those were due to errors in the data generation process. Similarly, when observing
more than one click on the same link in an impression, we kept only the rst click. Since the vast
majority of repeat clicks occur within seconds of the rst click (e.g., 84% occur within 10 seconds),
we believe that the repeat clicks are either user errors or attempts to reload the web site following
technical problems. If there are any repeat clicks that are not user errors or technical problems,
text and treating all ads with the same domain as identical. To the extent the text matters to consumers, it will be
subsumed in our noise terms.
8they are eectively assumed not to aect the user's payo (i.e., yield a zero marginal utility and
have a zero marginal cost), which would justify dropping them. Our nal dataset contains 92136
impressions, of which 17:7% have at least one click and 1:4% have at least two clicks.
2.2 Non-cascade clicks
Our dataset exhibits several features of user behavior that are not captured by the theoretical
models in the existing literature. Namely,
 46% of users who click do not click in the sequential order of positions, i.e. (1,2,...).
 57% of users who click more than once do not \cascade," i.e., click on a higher position after
clicking on a lower position.
These ndings are inconsistent with the cascade model or with the AE model, both of which
predict \cascades," and the latter also predicts sequential clicks. These ndings demonstrate the
importance of user heterogeneity. This is conrmed by having dierent orders of clicks by dierent
users facing the same impression.
We model heterogeneity by letting users have dierent preferences over ads. Formally, we do
this with a userad random utility eect.
2.3 Rich Externalities
Another important observation from the data is the prevalence of externalities: the CTR on a given
ad in a given position depends on which ads are shown in the other positions. These externalities
immediately violate the EOS model or any other model in which users' decisions of clicking on
dierent ads in an impression are independent of each other. Also, some of these externalities are
inconsistent with the cascade model.
The externalities are evident by examining the conditional probabilities of clicking on a given
ad in a given position under various assumptions about the ads displayed in the other positions.
For example, Table 1 presents evidence for \externalities from above": the CTR on a given link
displayed in position 2 conditional on the competitor displayed in position 1. (We were only able
to conduct this analysis for the most popular ads, for which there were enough observations with
desired impressions.) Comparison of the CTRs suggests negative externalities from the competitors.















Domain 4 no observations
Table 1: Conditional Click-Through Rates on domains www.whitepages.com in search string "white
pages" and try.weatherstudio.com in search string \weather" when placed in position 2 given dier-
ent domains in position 1. In parentheses we give standard errors. The estimates all have asymptotic
normal distributions.
relevance (Domain 3, which does not have any white-page information) rather than higher relevance
(any of the Domains 2,3). The same conclusion obtains in the \weather" search string: Having
Domain 3 (which does not have any weather information) as the above competitor is better than
having Domain 2. All this evidence is suggestive of negative externalities, which may be attributed
to users being satiated after clicking on good advertisements (in an extreme case of satiation, a user
might not derive any benet from a second ad { e.g., he may be fully satised with a single weather
report).
Domain Regime CTR Number of observations Avg. number of ads Di. of CTRs
Domain 2
With 0.1051 5061 6.1577 0:074
(0.009) Without 0.1785 2112 7.1089
Domain 3
With 0.1558 1560 7.1071 0:067
(0.013) Without 0.223 2022 7.632
Domain 4
With 0.1546 304 7.2993 0.019
(0.032) Without 0.1739 253 7.2885
Table 2: CTRs of dierent domains in position 1 with and without having Domain 1 as competitor
in any of the lower positions. One, two and three stars mean statistical signicance with respectively
10%, 5% and 1% level.
More evidence of negative externalities is presented in Table 2. In this table, we repeat the exer-
cise from the previous paragraph, but this time conditioning on the presence of certain competitors
10below. We can see that the dierences are again statistically signicant. Note that the average
number of competitors is lower in the impressions that have Domain 1, which acts in the opposite
direction to the negative externality, so if we had enough observations to control for the number
of ads in the impression we expect the dierences to be even larger. An important implication of
externalities from below is rejection of cascading models (including the AE model) in which users
always make clicking decisions going sequentially from top to bottom. Instead, users appear to
exhibit more rationality, examining many ads before decided which ones to click on.
Another interesting observation that is inconsistent with the basic cascade model is that switch-
ing the ads in the top two positions aects the CTR of the ad in position 3. We were able to
perform this analysis for one impression conguration on the \weather" search string. (The number
of relevant observations in the other cases was fewer than 300, and in search strings \games" and
\sex" there were no relevant observations at all.) The CTR of Domain 1 in position 3 conditional
on having Domain 3 in position 1 and Domain 2 in position two is 0:0434. When we switch the
top two ads, the CTR drops to 0:0077. The dierence is signicant with 0:05 test size. To perform
the test we used the asymptotic Wald test. The test statistic (distributed as standard normal)
was 2:193. As we mentioned earlier we believe that Domain 3 is not a very relevant domain for
\weather", while Domain 2 is very relevant. Thus, matching the better competitor domains with
the higher position has a negative externality on a lower ad. This externality can again be attributed
to user satiation: matching the better domain with the higher position increases the likelihood of
user clicking on the better domain, making him more satiated and less likely to click on the third
ad.
In addition to the externalities caused by satiation, we may also expect externalities caused by
user learning about the quality of ads (as in Athey and Ellison (2007)). In contrast to satiation,
we would expect learning to generate positive externalities: seeing one relevant ad would raise user
expectation about the relevance of ads in general and make him more likely to click on other ads.
Since the overall externalities exhibited in the data are negative, it appears that satiation is a more
important source of externalities than learning. It would be dicult to identify these two eects
separately given out data set: We cannot tell if a user stops clicking because he is satiated by the
ads he has clicked on or because he is discouraged by their poor quality. One way to distinguish
these two eects would be by using the data on \conversions" (i.e., purchases or follow-up requests)
following the clicks. Another way would be to consider long-run learning about the general quality
of ads across dierent search strings (where satiation is not an issue). Since we do not currently
11have data on conversions or on user histories, we cannot undertake either approach.
2.4 User Heterogeneity
Another interesting feature of the data is positive correlation between clicks on dierent positions
in a given impression. We found this correlation by looking at impressions with a given (the most
popular) ad is shown in position 1 and examining the correlation between clicking on this ad and
clicking on any other ad in the impression. In a model without satiation in which a user's values for
dierent ads are drawn independently (such as the EOS model), the correlation would be zero. In a
world with satiation but with independent draws, the correlation would be negative. However, Table
3 demonstrates that the actual correlation is in some cases positive and statistically signicant and
in others statistically insignicant. For example, when Domain 1 is displayed in position 1 on the
\weather" search string and the user clicks on it, the probability of clicking on any other position
is 5.1%, while if the user does not click on it, the probability of clicking on any other position is
3.4%, and this dierence is highly signicant. Similar signicant positive correlation is found in the
\white pages" search string, while in the other two search strings we nd no signicant correlation.
To explain these correlations, we model \vertical" heterogeneity of users, which makes some
users more likely than others to click on any ad. For example, some users can have higher utilities
for all ads (e.g., due to higher beliefs about the relevance of sponsored search advertising) or lower
costs of clicking on ads (e.g., due to lower opportunity cost of time). We capture this vertical
heterogeneity with a random user utility eect. The heterogeneity has to be large enough to oset
the negative correlation among clicks created by satiation and in some cases even to generate positive
correlation. This positive correlation is also needed to explain disproportionate numbers of multiple-
clicks observations (\bundles"). Namely, our model without satiation and with independent clicks
(which is then equivalent to the EOS model) would predict only 911 bundles of 2 clicked ads versus
1157 in the data, and only 20 bundles of 3 clicked ads versus 188 in the data. Introducing satiation
only increases this discrepancy, and so we need to add vertical heterogeneity of users to t the data
better.
3 The Model
Consider a user i who faces an impression a = (a1;:::;aN) 2 AN, where N is the number of ads
in the impression, A is the set of all possible ads that could be displayed, and an 2 A is the ad
12displayed in position n. Each ad a 2 A is characterized by a pair (pa;vai), where pa 2 [0;1] is the
probability that domain a will be prove to be relevant to him upon clicking, and vai is user i's value
derived from clicking on the ad when it turns out to be relevant to him (when it is not relevant,
the value is 0). The users learns whether an ad is relevant only upon clicking on it. The user also
incurs a cost fn from clicking on an ad in position n.
The timing of the user's decision problem is as follows:
(i) The user observes the impression (a1;:::;aN) and the pairs (pa;vai) for all ads in the impression.
(ii) The user either clicks on a position c in the impression that he hasn't clicked on yet or stops
clicking (exits).
(iii) The user observes whether the clicked ad ac is relevant to him or not.
(iv) Go to (ii):
We assume the user is a rational and forward-looking expected-utility maximizer and knows all
the parameters. His decision problem can then be modeled as a dynamic programming problem
whose payo-relevant state can be summarized with two disjoint subsets CR;CNR  f1;:::;Ng of
clicked positions that turned out to be relevant and irrelevant, respectively. The optimal contin-
uation value of user i in state (CR;CNR), which we denote by Vi (CR;CNR), is governed by the
following Bellman equation:








where Ui(CR;CNR) is the user's utility from stopping in state (CR;CNR). We postulate this utility















where R is a parameter that captures the substitutability of dierent ads to the user.
We assume that the value of user i for a given ad a is generated as
vai = qa + "ai + i;
13where qa is the xed \quality" eect of ad a, "ai is a random shock to user value for a given ad,
and i is a random eect in user value for ads. We assume that "ai is drawn from an exponential
distribution whose decay parameter is normalized to 1 (i.e., the c.d.f. is F ("ai) = 1   e "ai ). As
for i, it is drawn from a normal distribution whose standard deviation  is a parameter to be
estimated.
This model is rich enough to nest the following special cases:
 R = 0 (additively separable utility), pa = 1 (no uncertainty): The user's clicking decisions on
dierent ads are then independent, and there are no externalities across ads. If in addition
user random eects are absent (i.e.,  = 0), the clicks on the dierent positions are statistically





. Thus, provided that each ad receives a CTR less than one in any position
(which is certainly true empirically), our model nests as a special case the EOS model, in which
the CTR is the product of the ad xed eect (e qa) and the position xed eect (e fn).10
This nesting is the key motivation for us adopting the exponential distribution of errors "ai,
and it also allows a simple quantitative interpretation of the estimated xed eects on the
CTR. In the EOS case, a consistent estimate of the xed eects qa and fn can be obtained
with an OLS regression of the logarithm of CTR on the ad and position dummies. Note that
user uncertainty about relevance cannot be identied in this model - only the quality of ad
a, qa can be identied. Note also that since only the dierences qa   fn are identied in the
EOS model, the xed eects fn and qa are identied only up to a constant.




fn, i.e., the user derives utility from at most one ad (for example,
he derives no benet from viewing a second weather forecast.). This nests the classical con-
sumer search model (e.g., Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2009)). In this model, user
uncertainty about relevance matters: for example, if he has no uncertainty (pa = 1 for all a)
he will click on at most one ad; otherwise he may click on many ads. We can also approximate
\cascade models" by assuming that position clicking costs fn increase sharply in position n
relative to any variation in ad quality, which induces users to click positions top to bottom.
10If  > 0 but small, the random variable "ai+i can be approximated in the relevant upper tail with an exponential
distribution, and the CTR can be approximated with the EOS multiplicatively separable form. Still, the model would
be distinguishable from the EOS model by predicting a positive correlation between clicks on dierent positions.
14We also allow for the case of R < 0, in which the clicks are complements rather than substitutes.
4 Estimation and Identication
We estimate the model using the Simulated Generalized Method of Moments based on Pakes and
Pollard (1989).
Moments are computed using a nested dynamic programming approach. First we draw user
specic eects , . We compute the user's optimal policy by solving system (3.1) by backward
induction. The solution produces a stochastic process of ordered clicks for each user. We take 1000
draws from this stochastic process and compute the user-level average moments. We repeat the
; draws 100 times and take the average of user-level moments. Each iteration of the estimation
algorithm amounts to solving about one million dynamic programming problems.11
Our model has 46 unknown parameters and identies them using 78 moments. Our parameters
are divided into 3 groups:
 position xed eects fn, domain qualities qa and relevance probabilities pa,
 the standard variation  of the user random eect,
 the satiation parameter R and the domain/position normalizing constant.
We discuss the identication of all those groups separately.
For given vector of relevance probabilities p, we can identify the position xed eects fn(p) and
the domains' expected qualities qa(p) up to a constant even if R = 0. The moments that identify
these parameters are the CTRs of domains, the CTRs of positions, and the positions/domain
CTRs. Thus, we include the probabilities of clicking on each position from 1 to 5 conditional on
each search string, the probabilities of clicking on each domain conditional on each search string,
and the probabilities of clicking on each of the top 2 domains in each of the top 3 positions. (We
dropped the moments that proved to have a close to zero variance.) In the data we observe the
same domains placed in dierent positions, which allows us to identify the xed eects: We can
can identity position xed eects fn by comparing the CTR on the same given domain in dierent
positions, and we can identify ad qualities qa by comparing the CTRs of dierent ads in the same
position. (When R > 0, we also have to control for the ad's competitors.) Under our assumption
11Computations were possible because of supercomputer resources provided by Microsoft Corp.
15that user/position noise is distributed exponentially with decay parameter 1, the xed eects can
be interpreted as factors in the CTR.12
To identify the standard variation  of the user random eect we include the unconditional
probabilities of bundles of 2 and of 3 clicks. Increasing  increases the correlation of clicks on
dierent ads in the same impression, and so increases the probabilities of clicking bundles. (For
parametric identication we use the functional form assumption that user specic errors have a
normal distribution with mean 0.)
One the main contributions of this paper is identifying the user satiation parameter R and
separating utility from cost. For this purpose, we use two additional sets of moments. The rst
set is composed of conditional probabilities similar to those presented in Table 1. For each search
string, it consists of the following 3 moments:
 The probability of clicking on the most popular domain in position 2 conditional on the second
most popular domain being in position 1;
 The probability of clicking on the most popular domain in position 2 conditional on the third
most popular domain being in position 1;
 The probability of clicking on the second most popular domain in position 2 conditional on
the most popular domain being in position 1.
We dropped a couple of such moments that had zero observations in the sample. We did not in-
clude similar conditional probabilities for other impressions due to the small number of observations
with such impressions.
The second set of moments identifying R consists of probabilities of continuing clicking after
clicking on a given domain. We have 3 such moments per search string for the 3 most popular
domains. The satiation parameter is identied from these moments, since more satiation means
lower probabilities of continuing clicking. Given our assumed functional forms, the parameter R as
well as the normalizing constant separating domain utilities and position costs are both identied.
Identication is driven by the fact that moving a constant from costs to utilities and increasing R
produce dierent curvature of incremental utility of subsequent clicks as a function of the already
clicked links.
12Since the number of clicks on positions 6 and 7 is very small we assume that cost of clicking on those are
respectively 10% and 30% higher than on position 6, these numbers don't aect the estimation.
16When R 6= 0, we can separately identify domain relevance probabilities pa and their quality
parameters qa using the domain-specic continuation probabilities. Indeed, reducing pa while raising
qa while holding the product xed reduces increases the probability that the user continues clicking
after clicking on domain a (while it does not aect the probability of clicking on domain a when R is
close to zero). Intuitively, when we observe a domain with a high CTR but also a high probability of
continuing clicking after clicking it, we attribute the \discrepancy" to high user uncertainty about
the domain { i.e., low relevance probability pa oset with a high quality qa if relevant.13
We argued in the Section 2 that the cascade model and the AE models are not very realistic
because of wide presence of non-ordered clicks. To make sure that our model explains this phe-
nomenon we include, in addition to the already discussed moments, the probabilities of clicking on
a link in a higher position conditional on clicking on a link in a lower position for each search string.
We perform moment weighting using a consistent estimate of the optimal weighting matrix,
which in this case is the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
Estimation was done in 3 steps: (1) The moments conditions were evaluated at the starting point
to get the initial weighting matrix, (2) A minimization routine (using initial weighting matrix) was
performed and a consistent estimate of the optimal weighting matrix was computed, and (3) We
obtained nal estimates by minimizing the weighted sum of squared sample moment conditions.
To perform nonlinear optimization we used the Levenberg-Marquard gradient method14 with
a 10 9 tolerance factor. The starting point for the estimation was a consistent estimator of the
constrained model with R =  = 0. In this special case, the model is separable, so we obtained
consistent estimates of paqa and fn by regressing the logarithm of the domain/position CTRs on the
domain and position dummies. Because the cost and utility in the restricted model are identied
only up to a constant, we normalized the cost of clicking on the top position to be 0. We drop this
normalization when estimating the full model.
5 Results
The estimates of the main model are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Table 4 presents the estimated
position clicking costs for each search string. Table 5 presents the estimated quality measures of
selected domains, organized by search string. Finally Table 6 contains the estimates of the satiation
13An alternative explanation for the discrepancy is that users hold incorrect prior beliefs about the domain's quality.
It would be dicult to distinguish this explanation from our model of user uncertainty.
14Uses software developed by the University of Chicago, as Operator of Argonne National Laboratory.
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Table 3: Probability of clicking on any other ad conditional on clicking and not clicking on top
position
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Table 4: Estimates of clicking cost in the baseline model
parameter R and the user heterogeneity parameter .
Table 4 presents our estimates of clicking costs on positions 1 to 5 in the four chosen search
strings. (As mentioned earlier, we assume that positions 6 and 7 have respectively 10% and 30%
higher clicking cost than position 5.) To interpret the magnitude of those numbers, recall that the
utility of not clicking anything is normalized to 0. The fact that users face an exponential shock to
their utility means that reducing the cost of a position by 1 increases the CTR of the position by a
factor of e.
As expected, higher positions have lower cost of clicking. By exponentiating the cost dierences
we obtain the ratios of CTRs on dierent positions in the EOS world of R = 0. For example, in
the \games" search string, the CTR of a given ad in position 1 is exp(3:4   1:4)  7 times higher
in position 1 than in position 5. In the \weather" search string, the ration is exp(4:1   0:7)  30.
We do not know whether to attribute users' reluctance to click on lower positions to their
18Search string




























































































Table 6: Estimates of the structural parameters: the satiation parameter R and the standard
deviation  of the user random eect.
19bounded rationality that creates a high \psychic" cost of clicking on them, or to their rational
expectations that ads placed in lower positions have lower quality, as e.g. in the AE model. We
cannot answer this question given the available data. Answering this question would be important
to predict long-run responses to changes in the ad allocation policy. Yet, we can be agnostic about
this question in analyzing user behavior for a given allocation policy, or their short-run response to
a change in the policy.
Our separation of utility from cost also enables us to compare the costs of clicking on ads
under dierent keywords. For example, it turns out that people searching for \weather" nd it
relatively cheap to click of sponsored links, as opposed to those searching for \white pages". This
cost heterogeneity of search strings may be due to the selection of dierent users in dierent searches
and also to competition with the \organic search" results: If some keywords have better organic
search results than others it would manifest itself in our model as a higher cost of clicking on
sponsored search results. Unfortunately, we do not observe organic search links for the impressions
we analyze, so we cannot test this hypothesis.
It is also interesting to note the heterogeneous cost dierences between positions. This observa-
tion is important for optimizing bidding strategy in the keyword auctions. For example, the biggest
percentage jump in cost between position 1 and 2 is observed for \weather". It suggests that there
is a lot of extra value for winning slot number 1 vs. 2. At the same time for \sex" this dierence is
much smaller so an advertiser might benet from bidding less and taking position 2.
Table 5 presents the estimates of qualities and relevance probabilities of selected domains for
each keyword. In each keyword, we have selected the 4 most-clicked domains and pooled all the other
domains, assuming they have the same quality. We can now supplement our reduced-form evidence
negative externalities from Section 2 with structural estimates that provide us with quantitative
guidance about the relative qualities of the domains. The advantage is that now we do not need to
guess which domains are stronger and which are weaker competitors.
For example, in the \games" search string, the largest number of clicks is received by the
Microsoft-owned Domain 1, yet the structural model yields that this domain has the lowest quality
of the top 4. The structural model attributes the large number of clicks on this domain to its frequent
placement in top positions (which presumably was done by Microsoft to promote the service). The
same phenomenon is observed for Microsoft's Domain 3 in the \weather" search string. Moreover,
the description of this domain suggests that is service with maps, so users can be uncertain if it
contains weather. This explains the domain's relatively low relevance probability.
20We investigated the domains advertised on the \sex" string and found that only Domain 1 is
directly relevant to the search query. Domain 2 is a general Internet shopping web site, Domain 3
is a health nutrition store and Domain 4 is a spam domain with no content other than sponsored
links. Our estimates of domain qualities are consistent with these ndings. However, it is interesting
that Domain 4 is estimated to have a relatively high quality. We cannot reveal the domain name
due to Microsoft's privacy restrictions, but we can say that it is very well chosen, suggesting success
in sexual life. We think that many users are disappointed by the domain after clicking on it, which
explains the domain's lowest relevance probability among the \sex" domains.15
Our estimates of satiation and of user heterogeneity are presented in Table 6. The interpretation
of the standard deviation  is that dierent users' probabilities of clicking on a given ad in a given
position may dier on average by a factor of exp ' 9:5.
15In our model, users are induced to click on this domain because they rationally expect that its quality will be
high if it proves to be relevant for them. Alternatively, the same data can be explained with a model (estimated in
an earlier version of this paper) in which users are deceived by the domain's name into expecting the domain to be
highly relevant and are systematically disappointed upon clicking on it. It would be dicult to distinguish between
the models of rational user learning and incorrect priors from the available data. Note, however, that the policy
implications of the two models would be quite dierent: high placement of \uncertain" domains may benet rational
users by facilitating their learning, while high placement of \deceptive" domains would hurt users.
21(d1) (d2) (d3) (d4) (d5) R=0
(d1) - 0.116 0.100 0.121 0.126 0.136
(d2) 0.093 - 0.089 0.107 0.114 0.124
(d3) 0.155 0.166 - 0.169 0.164 0.175
(d4) 0.085 0.101 0.084 - 0.107 0.118
(d5) 0.045 0.054 0.048 0.056 - 0.133
(d1) (d2) (d3) (d4) (d5) R=0
(d1) - 0.062 0.065 0.049 0.070 0.075
(d2) 0.022 - 0.030 0.021 0.033 0.037
(d3) 0.019 0.022 - 0.018 0.027 0.032
(d4) 0.057 0.067 0.070 - 0.075 0.079
(d5) 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.010 - 0.052
(d1) (d2) (d3) (d4) (d5) R=0
(d1) - 0.146 0.159 0.129 0.171 0.183
(d2) 0.057 - 0.084 0.068 0.111 0.124
(d3) 0.045 0.063 - 0.054 0.090 0.104
(d4) 0.081 0.111 0.118 - 0.147 0.160
(d5) 0.016 0.022 0.025 0.018 - 0.108
(d1) (d2) (d3) (d4) (d5) R=0
(d1) - 0.227 0.236 0.225 0.236 0.243
(d2) 0.033 - 0.076 0.059 0.078 0.086
(d3) 0.019 0.035 - 0.031 0.046 0.056
(d4) 0.050 0.091 0.099 - 0.106 0.115
(d5) 0.013 0.025 0.030 0.022 - 0.089
Table 7: Predicted CTR on a domain in position 2 conditional on dierent competitors in position 1 and conditional on a \dummy
competitor" inposition 1 who creates no satiation.
2
2Search string
games weather white pages sex
Domain 1
True data 0:094 0:073 0:129 0:256
R=0 0:126 0:082 0:158 0:271
Domain 2
True data 0:042 0:022 0:086 0:072
R=0 0:068 0:032 0:123 0:098
Domain 3
True data 0:119 0:024 0:063 0:030
R=0 0:152 0:035 0:095 0:049
Domain 4
True data 0:047 0:012 0:099 0:115
R=0 0:074 0:019 0:139 0:131
Domain 5
True data 0:063 0:012 0:031 0:031
R=0 0:105 0:019 0:062 0:056
Table 8: Counterfactual domain CTRs if there are no externalities, i.e R = 0
To interpret the quantitative signicance of the externality parameter R, we performed two
counterfactual exercises. In the rst exercise, we consider a hypothetical impression with only two
advertisements and we compute the eect of satiation on the CTR of the advertiser in position 2.
That is, we calculate the probability of the advertiser in slot 2 getting clicked when the user is not
satiated by the ad in slot 1 (e.g., when a very low quality ad is placed in position 1), and compare
it with the CTRs with satiation for dierent actual competitors placed in slot 1. Table 7 presents
the results. The biggest losses due to satiation occur in the \sex" string, on ads that compete with
Domain 1 in position 1. For example, the CTR of Domain 3 in position 2 would be almost 3 times
higher if it did not compete with Domain 1 in position 1. On the other hand, Domain 1 itself,
being a high-quality ad, does not suer much from externalities: its CTR in position 2 would have
been only 3%-9% higher had it faced no competition from position 1.
The second counterfactual exercise is performed on the actual data. We simulate the CTRs of
selected domains in the observed impressions in the hypothetical world without satiation (i.e., in
which R = 0) and compare the results with the actual empirical CTRs. The simulation results are
presented in Table 8. Unlike in the previous exercise, the size of the loss now depends not only on
the domain's own quality but also on how often it faces strong competitors in the impression. A
good example is given by comparing Domain 1 in \games" to Domain 4 in \white pages". Both
of those domains have similar CTRs, however Domain 4 gains much more in the counterfactual.
23Search string
games weather white pages sex
Domain 1
True data 0:094 0:073 0:129 0:256
No uncertainty 0:087 0:072 0:121 0:254
Domain 2
True data 0:042 0:022 0:086 0:072
No uncertainty 0:052 0:022 0:100 0:073
Domain 3
True data 0:119 0:024 0:063 0:030
No uncertainty 0:121 0:026 0:078 0:032
Domain 4
True data 0:047 0:012 0:099 0:115
No uncertainty 0:059 0:013 0:102 0:120
Domain 5
True data 0:063 0:012 0:031 0:031
No uncertainty 0:062 0:012 0:029 0:034
Table 9: Counterfactual domain CTRs if all uncertainty about ad quality of resolved prior to clicking
decisions
While in general better domains tend to lose less due to externalities, the magnitude of the loss
varies by search string. We also calculate that the total number of clicks in our dataset would have
increased by 40% had satiation been absent.16
We can also quantify the eects of user uncertainty about relevance by considering the counter-
factual in which this uncertainty is resolved before the user starts clicking. (For example, the search
engine can reduce uncertainty by oering longer website descriptions, user comments, or experts
opinions.) Although it is straightforward that eliminating user uncertainty will raise user welfare, a
priori it is not clear how it would aects the total CTR. Table 9 presents the CTR eects on each
domain of removing uncertainty about the relevance of ads. We note that the ads that benet from
this change are the ones with the greatest uncertainty (lowest relevance probability), while the ads
with relevance probability close to 1 receive lower CTRs in the counterfactual regime. The second
row of Table 11 presents the eects of removing uncertainty on user welfare and the total CTR: the
counterfactual raises user welfare by nearly 14% and also yields a slight increase in the total CTR.
16We cannot estimate the loss of advertiser prots caused by externalities, because of lack of click conversion data.
This issue is left for further research.
246 Counterfactual Matching Policies
This section presents the outcomes of simulations that compare user welfare and the total CTR for
counterfactual matching policies of ads to positions. (Since we do not observe the advertisers' bids,
we use the total CTR is our proxy for the search engine's revenue.) In particular, it is interesting to
consider the matching policy that maximizes the users' expected utility and a potentially dierent
policy that maximizes the total CTR.
A natural candidate matching policy is Assortative Matching (AM), in which the ads are dis-
played in the decreasing order of their quality qa. (This policy is feasible for Microsoft provided
that they know the qualities of the dierent ads. We suspect that Microsoft has some estimates of
quality though they might not be perfect.) This policy in fact maximizes the total CTR and users'
expected utility in the cases of our model without externalities and uncertainty (pa = 1):
Proposition 6.1. If R = 0 and each ad receives a CTR less than one in each position, then
assortative matching maximizes both the total CTR and the user's expected utility.
Proof: It suces to show that this is true conditional on any given realization of the user's
random eect i: this will imply that the same is true on expectation over i.
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So in this benchmark model the user's expected utility coincides with the CTR and is again maxi-
mized by assortative matching.
When R > 0, the conclusion no longer holds, and we can nd examples in which the total CTR
or expected user utility are not maximized by AM. The intuition for how assortative matching can
be improved upon for users is that for two ads with the same quality qa it is strictly optimal to put
the ad with the lower relevance probability pa in a higher position so as to reduce the user's cost of
learning its relevance. (Similar changes raise the CTR but to a smaller extent.)
Example 6.1. Suppose that R > 0. There are two ads: A = f1;2g, with ad 2 having no relevance
uncertainty: p2 = 1. The position clicking costs are f2 > f1. Compare the two possible impressions:
25Utility CTR
Data 0.23 - 0.18 -
No Uncertainty 0.27 +14.1% 0.19 +3.0%
OLS 0.26 +12.8% 0.2 +10.1%
Max U 0.27 +13.3% 0.2 +9.9%
Max CTR 0.26 +12.8% 0.2 +10.1%
Max U with misspecied model
(no externalities)
0.27 +13.3% 0.2 +9.9%
First Best 0.37 +59.0% 0.25 +34.5%
Table 10: Counterfactual matching regimes
(1;2) and (2;1): A user can have four possible types of optimal strategies: (a) always click on both
ads, (b) always click on zero ads, (c) always click on one ad, and (d) click on the uncertain ad 1,
and then click on ad 2 if and only if ad 1 proves to be irrelevant. (Of course, the optimal strategy
may depend on the impression as well as the user's realized utility.) The expected payos from
strategies (a) and (b) are the same on the two impressions. Since strategy (c) yields the same payo
as if R = 0, the expected payo from this strategy is maximized by assortative matching, by the
above proposition. However, the payo from strategy (d) is maximized on impression (1;2), since
with probability 1   p1 it avoids clicking on ad 2. Thus, for parameter values for which strategy
(b) is suciently likely to be optimal to the user on both impressions, it is optimal to display the
uncertain ad above the certain ad, even if the certain as has higher expected quality (q2 > p1q1):
Similarly if there is no externalities i.e. R = 0, but there is uncertainty, the assortative matching
might be sub-optimal both for maximizing consumer surplus as well as CTR.
Example 6.2. Suppose there are two ads (p1;q1) = (1;10) and (p2;q2) = (0:2;10), and there is no
user heterogeneity. The position clicking costs are f1 = 1 and f2 = 8. In case when the ads are
matched assortitatively, i.e. ad 1 is placed on position 1, the expected utility is 9 and expected CTR
is 1. In this case position 1 gets clicked, position two doesn't because incurring high cost of clicking
8, is not justied by the low probability of the reward. In case we match ad 1 to position two the
user will click both ads, getting expected utiltiy equal to 11:2
We simulate both welfare- and CTR-optimal matching policies on our data, and compare them
to both assortative matching (ad qualities are obtained by estimating EOS model using OLS) and
26Utility CTR
Data 0.23 - 0.18 -
Max U 0.37 +59.0% 0.25 +34.5%
Max CTR 0.23 -1.5% 0.28 +49.7%
Max U with misspecied model
(no externalities)
0.33 +42.5% 0.25 +37.6%
Max CTR with misspecied model
(no externalities)
0.28 +20.9% 0.25 +33.7%
Assortative Matching 0.35 +48.5% 0.25 +36.3%
Table 11: Consumer level targeting
the actual data. As shown in Table 10, we nd that assortative matching that does not take into
account uncertainty would raise user welfare by 12.8% and the total CTR by 10.1%. It turns out
that this matching policy coincides with user optimal policy. While in theory those two regimes do
not have to coincide it turns out that in practice the give the same matching rules.
If the search engine tries to maximize welfare ignoring the presence of externalities it turns out
that it will arrive at the policy that maximizes CTR. Again in theory those two do not have to
coincide. Moreover, the dierence in welfare and CTR between this matching rule and the one from
the previous paragraph is below 1%. It leads us to conclude that if the search engine cannot target
ad placement on the level of individual user there is no signicant improvements in adjusting the
matching software from assortative matching using OLS estimates to more sophisticated schemes.
Moreover, if one does not account for externalities, the perceived 'welfare maximizing' matching
scheme might be actually inferior to OLS assortative matching.
The above assertions treat the average CTR as a proxy for total revenue. In reality, however the
revenue is a sum of clicks weighted by costs per click. In case the costs per click are heterogeneous
one can give examples under which assortative matching gives suboptimal results. Consider the
following example from the data.
Example 6.3. Take Domains 2 and 3 from the weather search string, and ignore all the other
domains. In the data we observe impressions when those domains switch places with eachother.
One way to rationalize this fact is that the search engine is indierent between both placements.
Moreover suppose that it is doing a weighted a bid-weighted assortative matching using the OLS
estimates of EOS model. We can therefore infer that the bids for those ads have to be proportional
27to the inverse of the exponent of the OLS quality estimates, i.e. exp(4:3) and exp(4:6). One can
take those bids, and compute the search engine revenue under dierent matching policies of those
ads to rst and second position. It turns out that OLS assortative matching gives about 5% less
revenue than non-assortative one.
Unfortunately given the available dataset it is impossible to seperately identify costs per click
without having data on advertisers bids or valuations.
6.1 First best targetting
Next we examine the improvements that could be achieved by \rst-best" targeting, i.e., condition-
ing the impressions on the user's utility characteristics i, i. This approximates the situation in
which the search engine uses information about the consumers like search history or demographics
to tailor the impression. As shown in Table 11, moving towards rst-best welfare-maximizing raises
the user's expected utility by 59% from the actual data, and raises the total CTR by 34.5%. If we
instead implement CTR-maximizing rst-best targeting, we increase the CTR by 49.7%, without
signicant loss to utility (about 1%). We take it a an evidence that there are extra prot opportu-
nities from exploring user level targeting that are also benecial for the consumers. Microsoft does
have access to substantial information about users' browsing habits stored in \cookies" on their
computers, and this information is especially rich for users who have opened \Microsoft Passport "
accounts (special accounts that oer a gateway to e-mail, Internet communicator, and many other
services). To the best of our knowledge, Microsoft does not yet target sponsored search results to
individual users. However, it is now pretty common to target display ads within webpages (in par-
ticular Yahoo! and Google-Doubleclick are known for doing this.) Our analysis of full-information
targeting can be viewed as an upper bound on what can be achieved with targeted advertising.
We examined how a potential model misspecication can aect a performance of a consumer level
targeting. As mentioned earlier, not accounting for externalities or using simple OLS assortative
matching does not decrease the performance of the placement algorithm, if the search engine cannot
target ads for each user. However, in the presence of such targeting possibility, suboptimalities might
be signicant. When using assortative matching, that does not take into account externalities and
uncertainty, welfare of the consumers improves by 48:5% and CTR by 36:3%. Therefore, welfare
loss of using this matching policy amounts to about 10:5%, compared to the rst best solution.
Interestingly, if the search engine tries to be more sophisticated and implements optimal matching
'as if' there we no externalities, the loss of welfare is greater and amounts to 16:5%. This eect
28is even more pronounced in the misspecied placement policy that tries to maximize CTR. This
matching policy, presented in the 5th row of Table 11 is Pareto dominated by rst best welfare
matching and even by assortative matching. To see the mechanism of this process, we consider an
example from the data. Suppose the impression from the \weather" keyword has 3 ads of qualities
repectively: 3.92, 3.37 and 1.49 (position clicking costs are: -0.73, -1.69 ,-1.28). Now suppose that
search engine wants to maximize CTR and thinks that there are no externalities (R=0), but takes
into account uncertainty. It is going to match as follows: (3:9; 0:7), (3:3; 1:68) and (1:49; 1:27).
If R = 0 and p is big it should give 3 clicks. However, on average it gives only 1.03 clicks because
users get satiated after clicking on the rst ad, and click on the second ad only if the rst is
not relevant. Instead, what one should do is assortative matching: (3:9; 0:7), (3:3; 1:27) and
(1:49; 1:68) which gives 2 vs. 1.03 clicks on average and on top of that more utility.
That being said, we note that sometimes not-assortative matching might be actually a good
idea. Suppose the one ad is very strong and the other one very week, but good enough to be
clicked on top position. The rst one gets clicked for sure on any position, and in case of assortative
matching second one gets clicked only if the rst one is not relevant. So to maximize CTR one would
want to revert the assortative matching. This eect however turns out to be much weaker that the
one mentioned in the previous paragraph. That is why, assortative matching Pareto dominates
misspecied CTR-optimal user level matching in the data.
Those results lead us to conclusion that if the search engine is uniformed about the strength or
even presence of externalities, it can come up with suboptimal matching schemes that are Pareto
dominated by the simple assortative matching. Although there is a lot to gain by implementing
more sophisticated matching schemes on the user level, one has to make sure that the estimates of
externalities are correct.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of externalities among ads in sponsored-search advertising,
of user heterogeneity, and of user uncertainty regarding the relevance of ads to them. The evidence
is provided using both reduced-form tests and a structural models of expected utility-maximizing
users.
The advantage of the structural model is that it we can estimate the impact of externalities and
uncertainty on CTRs of advertisers, social welfare of consumers and total CTR that is proxy of
29prots for the search engine. We nd signicant impact of both uncertainty (usually in the range
of couple per-cent, with maximal 25% drop of CTR for one advertiser) and externalities (usually
around 30% drop in CTR) on advertisers' CTR.
We alse make counterfactual predictions for dierent ad placement regimes and quantify \user
experience" as the average user's expected utility. We nd that an alternative ad placement policy
could raise user welfare by 12%, and that the increase could go up to 59% if information is available
to target the placement to specic consumers. This suggests a large potential for ad targeting based
on user level covariates, such as demographics or previous search history.
We also nd that if the search engine tries to implement sophisticated matching policies but
uses an misspecied model (for example the one that does not account for externalities) it can end
up in suboptimal matching policies that are Pareto dominated by a simple assortative matching. In
case when the ad placement cannot be targeted on users the losses are not very large, but in case
of user level targeting they may reach even 16% of consumer welfare.
The interpretation of our counterfactuals depends on our attribution of on position xed eects
{ namely, if these eects would be aected in the long run by implementation of an alternative ad
placement policy. If the xed eects are position-specic clicking costs that do not depend on the
matching policy, then our counterfactuals are valid in the long run as well as in the short run. If
instead these xed eects are due to users' expectations that higher positions contain more relevant
ads, these expectations will be altered in the long run under the new matching policy, which is not
accounted for in our model. While we believe it is important to study long-run user learning of
position-specic ad relevance, the dataset on the Beyond Search DVD does not allow is to do it as
it does not track users over time. This is an important direction for future research.
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